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Familie und Netzwerk
Who Remains a Friend after Divorce?
M.I. Broese van Groenou / H.D. Flap (Utrecht)
This paper examines the usefulness of a simple, but general model of the
(dis)investment in relations within a given social structure, as an explanation for
network changes following a particular Status transition, viz. a divorce. Divorce is
a life-event of particular interest because part of the personal networks of the
spouses will have to be divided in the course ofthe Separation. These changes will
allow examination of the mechanisms leading to the break-up or maintenance of
social relationships. Our theoretical model places individual rational action within
the restrictions ofthe social structure. A social network is seen as the independent
social context that both restricts and facilitates individual action, which, in tum,
influences and changes the structure of a social network. The link between
individual action and social structure can be found in the concept of "social
capital". The key idea in our proposition is to conceive ofpersonal social networks
as ameans to achieve one's ends, i.e. as social capital that produces more agreeable
conditions of life. This idea does lead not only to the networks-as-resource
argument, but it also suggests that the (dis)investment in persons depends on the
present value of future help. Important life events may change the value of social
capital as well as the expectation of actually having to make use of former
Investments. Following this line of reasoning, explanations of changes in social
networks come within reach.
The theoretical model will have to deal with the changes in social relations
following a marital Separation or divorce. On a continuum these changes vary from
the emergence, maintenance and strengthening on the one hand, to the weakening
and breaking off on the other hand. Since dyads are the unit of analysis, the central
actors in the theoretical model are the divorced individual and a member ofhis/her
personal network. Amore comprehensive explanation will have to consider at least
four dyades: the mutual ties within a network between the divorced male and
female and a couple, known to both the ex-partners. Accordingly, changes in a
number of network stractures that are possible with dyads, triads and quadrants
should be explained. Yet, the model presented here is restricted to the choice
alternatives of one actor, the divorced individual.
Cracial to an explanatory model are the auxiliary assumptions that specify the
choice Situation ofthe ex-partners in terms ofthe more general behavioral theory:
the behavioral alternatives are restricted and/or facilitated by the Situation of the
actor. Several restrictions in the social structure can be distinguished: the size and
density of the personal network and the amount of time and money available to
maintain social contacts. The choices made by the actors will be determined by the
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ease with wich existing relations can be replaced by new ones. The extensive zone
of acquaintances is important as a pool out of which new contacts can be recraited
in case existing contacts fail or become a bürden or do not fumish the expected
support. In general, people will cling longer to a particular relationship (even if its
expected value for future help has diminished) when they are not capable to
Substitute the existing relationships. The Substitution of network members is
assumed to be easier in a loose-knit network than in a strong-knit network. The
break-up with a few network members will almost always affect the ties with other
network members in a dense network. This is much less the case in a open network,
in which network members hardly interact. In addition, the actor's circumstances
such as the time and money available can Hmit the possibilities to maintain
relations.
Within the stractural limits that determine the kind and number of ties to be
maintained, created or broken off, individual action is based on two choices: the
decision to change the number or content of ties or not and the selection ofthe tie(s)
to be affected. In the theoretical explanation of these choices, we combine ideas
from two different theoretical perspectives with the general theory of rational
action, namely the cognitive-motivational theory of mental incongraity and the
theoretical notion of social capital.
In the general theory ofrational choice, it is assumed that the realization ofthe
ultimate goal orgoals people may pursue (eg. well-being) requires the achievement
of some intermediate goals. One of these intermediate goals, viz. access to
(available) social resources, is attained when having social relations.
From more cognitive-based behavioral theories (e.g. the theory of mental
incongraity), the assumption is adopted that the degree of mental incongraity
between the desired number of social relations and the perceived number of social
relations, leads to the tendency to behave in a more or less active way. In addition,
the subjective perception of available behavioral alternatives may differ from the
objectively measured conditions for behavioural alternatives. With respect to our
model of personal networks, it can be stated that the degree of the individual's
orientation to change the number and content of the presently existing social
relations, is determined by the wish to change the number and content of the ties
and the perceived ability to change these ties.
The concept of social capital is introduced in order to explain why a particular
contact is changed or not. The decision to invest or disinvest in a particular contact
partly depends on the relative amount of social capital represented by the relation¬
ship in comparison with other available relationships. The expected value offuture
support from a relation depends on the prior Investments ofego in this contact. The
larger the investment, the greater the ego's expectation of a valued retum. The
expected value of maintaining a relation is also related to the perceived attribution
of guilt and trespassing of norms by network members. The continuation of a
relationship with somebody who disapproves ofthe divorce decreases the expected
retum of former Investments.
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To test this preliminary model we recently started a longitudinal research.
From a sample consisting of 150 recently separated males and females, including
35 ex-couples, we gathered data about the size, content and density oftheir network
before and after marital Separation. In addition, we interviewed two network
members of each divorcee by phone and asked them about the changes in the
relation following the divorce.
The presented model is yet preliminary and needs elaboration on the following
aspects. Network members are to be introduced as actors who are assumed to have
the same stractural constraints and choice of behavioral alternatives as the
divorcee. Also, it is very likely that network members base their decision to
(dis)invest in the relationship on the same kind of arguments as the divorcee, viz.
the expectation and the extent offuture support and the costs perceived to maintain
the relation with the divorcee. Subsequently, the interaction between two, three and
four actors must be taken into account. A weakness that often recurs in rational
choice modeis, including the presented model, is that arguments are lacking in the
relative weight of Utility arguments. Also, the explanation of the consequences of
a divorce for the social network ofthe persons enmeshed in this network, requires
not only the explanation of individual decisions but also a worked-out transforma-
tion of all individual effects into a new network structure, just as in the explanation
of "real macro-phenomena". Obviously, the changes in personal social networks
following a divorce are not merely the sum of all the changes in social relations.
Finally, the actual elements that make up the content of the model can also be
questioned, or more generally, the use of rational choice with respect to behavior
in which emotions are involved.
Personenpaare und Beziehungskisten
Donald Bender (München)
Ein Plädoyer zur Benutzung von Datenbankprogrammenund ein Bericht über
die Möglichkeiten der lokalen Rollenanalyse in der Netzwerkforschung.
In den Gesellschaftswissenschaften, mit Ausnahme der Wirtschaftswissen¬
schaften, werden hauptsächlich univariate und multivariate Analysen über Indivi¬
duen oder Institutionen gemacht. Daraus Hesse sich schliessen, dass sich diese
Wissenschaften nur mit den Individuen oder Institutionen, nicht jedoch mit dem
Beziehungsgefüge zwischen diesen Individuen und Institutionen bzw. der Ge¬
samtstruktur der Gruppe, der Gesellschaft oder dem Staat beschäftigen. Weil
diesen Analysen immer zweidimensionale Datenmatrizen mit Fällen und Varia¬
blen zugrunde liegen, lässt sich - ein bisschen provokativ - daraus die Hypothese
ableiten: Die Art der Datenhaltung wirkt sich auf die analysierten Datenmodelle
aus und damit indirekt auf den Fortgang und die Möglichkeiten in der Forschung.
In der Familienforschung werden unter anderem soziale Gebilde wie Haus¬
halt, Familie, Verwandtschaft und soziale Kontakte untersucht. Eine der Fragen
